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ESSAY
CHANGE AND CONTINUITY ON THE SUPREME
COURT: CONVERSATIONS WITH JUSTICE HARRY A.
BLACKMUN*
Philippa Strum**
Justice Harry A. Blackmun used to enjoy telling a story about
Supreme Court conferences during the Court's 1970 term, his first
on the Court. Warren Burger was Chief Justice; Hugo Black was the
most senior Justice. Court protocol, of course, is that the Chief
Justice begins the discussion of each case, the most senior Justice
speaks second, and the floor goes in turn to each of the other
Justices according to descending seniority. Chief Justice Burger
would present a case by laying out the issues involved as he saw
them and the decision he believed the Court should reach. Then he
would turn to Justice Black who, in a voice filled with sorrow and
reproach, would lament, "Oh, Chief Justice!" and proceed to analyze
the case in completely different terms.
Their disagreement was most noticeable in constitutional cases,
and was indicative of the difficulties faced by the Justices as they
attempted to apply the sweeping mandates of the Constitution to
specific cases. When he joined the bench of the Supreme Court on
* This article is based on three taped conversations with Justice Blackmun at the
Supreme Court: October 25, December 13, and December 14, 1993. Despite repeated*
questions about specific cases and doctrines, he chose to speak more informally about life on
the Court. Upon reading the proposed piece shortly after the interviews took place, however,
Justice Blackmun asked that it be withheld. He feared that it might be embarrassing to some
of his colleagues with whom he still worked, and had decided on reflection that he preferred
to save the material in it for a book he planned to write after he retired.
Anyone who had the good fortune to be charmed by the courtly and caring gentleman
Blackmun will understand why I complied with his request. I hope Iwould have done so even
had he not plied me with chocolates from his desk drawer and kissed me good-bye when our
interviews ended.
** Walter Gibbs Visiting Professor of Constitutional Law, Wayne State University Law
School; Broecklundian Professor Emerita of Political Science, City University of New York.
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June 9,1970, Blackmun said he was surprised and somewhat taken
aback to realize the percentage of Court cases that involved
constitutional issues, as this was not the situation on the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit on which he had served. During
the years between 1970 and 1993 he had come to take the long view
of constitutional adjudication, referring in a number of lectures to
the "trends and countertrends"1 that manifest themselves on the
Court as the Justices grope to interpret the Constitution while
taking note of the current needs of society. The Constitution and the
role of the Court in the American political system are phenomena
providing continuity; change comes with every alteration of the
Court's membership and from the ever-diversifying circumstances
faced by the country at large. Blackmun's years on the Court can
perhaps best be described as an attempt to ensure that the Court
maintained the proper balance between continuity and change while
seeing that justice was done.
The paragraphs below are offered largely without comment. They
are not meant as an analysis either of Blackmun's jurisprudence or
of his comments about the way the Court works and about the other
Justices. Rather, they are a summary of his remarks, presented in
the hope that they may be useful to scholars of the Supreme Court.
Blackmun spoke with awe of the intelligence of the men who
wrote the Constitution, calling them "wise beyond their years," and
wondered at the luck of the country in their having assembled in
Philadelphia during the hot summer of 1787. "I shudder when I hear
suggestions about changing the Constitution," he commented. It is
"the basic document that this country lives by," and it has served
the country well. He and the other Justices considered it "a pretty
good document." This scarcely suggested, however, that it was self-
interpreting or even easy to interpret. Although the "average lay
person thinks that there it is: that it is engraved in stone and
there's no question about what it means," Justice Blackmun
considered "one of the beauties" of the Constitution to be its writers'
use of "great phrases with flexibility built into them. After all," he
1. Philip Corrizosa, Blackmun Says Changes at High Court, White House Should Not
Stir Concern, L.A. DAILY J., Nov. 18, 1988, at 22; see also Justice Harry A- Blackmun,
Movement and Countermovement, The Dwight D. Opperman Lecture on Constitutional Law,
Drake University Law School (Oct. 26, 1988), in 38 DRAKE L. REV. 747 (1989).
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asked rhetorically, "what is due process of law? What is equal
protection of the laws, and all of the contents of the amendments?"
What the public failed to understand was that the Justices were
called upon constantly to interpret the great phrases: when all was
said and done, "the Constitution is what we're here for in this
Court."
Blackmun, not a believer in original intent, nonetheless empha-
sized the Constitution rather than individual preference as the
starting point of all constitutional jurisprudence: "It certainly
governs the discussions and analyses that we here try to put into
our thought." The responsibility for applying the Constitution was
a grave one. "Here we are, interpreting and working on the basic
document that this country lives by. It is pretty important that we
get it right."
Getting it right meant, in part, turning to precedent first. The
easiest cases were those where the precedents were clear and the
case under consideration by the Court appeared to fall within those
parameters. "It's when we have to take a further step into the
unknown that it becomes a little more difficult. Lots of times [that's]
where the Court splits, some saying we're not willing to take that
step, we've gone far enough on this issue.., don't think we should
go any further," he noted.
Self-restraint in judicial policy-making frequently might be wise,
and yet taking a step into the unknown was "what the Warren
Court [did] all the time," much to the benefit of the country. So the
precise balance to be struck between continuity and change would
itself be in a constant process of metamorphosis, usually affected in
good part by the differing constitutional philosophies of the various
Justices.
"There's a lot of volition on our part," Blackmun said. "That's what
we're here for." Because the Constitution's phrases contain impor-
tant but insufficient guidance, members of the Court are largely
dependent on their beliefs about what the Constitution was
designed to do and the extent to which they can legitimately take
note of societal needs. They "not only work with the written word,
but with the preferences that the constitutional phrases permit
them to draw on. It gets down really to the question of what's one's
basic constitutional philosophy." The result is frequently misinter-
preted by the media. The media misleads, in part, by insistently
labeling Justices as "liberal" or "conservative." Blackmun pointed to
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Justice Thurgood Marshall2 as an example of a Justice who was
usually characterized as "liberal" and who participated in many
decisions that might well be typified as such, but whom Blackmun
described as "basically conservative." By that he meant that
Marshall preferred to "work within the system" when it was at all
possible-a preference with which Blackmun was in full sympathy,
although he recognized that it was not one held by all the Justices.
Anyone who believed the Constitution was open to only one
interpretation, Blackmun pointed out, had only to contrast the
philosophy of Justice William J. Brennan with that of Justice James
McReynolds or Chief Justice Warren Burger-although Blackmun
thought Burger had been "fairly liberal" at times.
If individual philosophy was important in constitutional adjudica-
tion, Blackmun continued, the dynamics of the Court were no less
so. Some dynamics were the same no matter who sat on the Court;
others varied with particular personnel. The process of drafting,
criticizing, and rewriting opinions would always be part of the
Court's work. It was of particular importance, however, on those
occasions when the Justices were divided ideologically. In a Court
as split as it was during Blackmun's tenure, "one has to get that
fifth vote," and as a result, "many of our opinions are the result of
compromise."
Opinions for the Court changed during the drafting process
because "sometimes one says what he'd prefer not to say in order to
get that fifth vote." Suggestions for language changes came most
frequently from the Chief Justice and the senior Justices rather
than from the newer members of the Court. When two Justices
disagreed about the content of a proposed opinion, "they end[ed] up
with something they negotiated about and a deal which neither one
was happy about, but at least it [was] acceptable to both." And
perhaps, Blackmun mused, "that's good constitutional interpreta-
tion." Although the jockeying for votes could lead to acceptance of
language a Justice really disliked, the process of give-and-take and
the assessing of conflicting beliefs implicit in constitutional
adjudication was valuable. Blackman said he strongly endorsed
2. Justices Blackmun and Marshall served together until the latter's retirement on June
27, 1991.
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Justice Louis D. Brandeis's statement that "Man is weak and his
judgment is at best fallible."3
The need for compromise, then, was built into the dynamic of the
Court, and the institution benefited from the presence of Justices
who could make the process work. Specific Justices were particu-
larly praiseworthy for their ability to get agreement from as many
of their colleagues as possible. Justice Lewis F. Powell was a
"balancing factor" on the Court, liking to "pull the two sides to-
gether." Justice Hugo Black's years in the Senate made him a
compromiser who knew how to negotiate.
Compromise could be overdone, however. "Some opinions are
committee opinions . . . and they aren't very good." Blackmun
particularly regretted having agreed to insert a passage in his
opinion for the Court in Roe v. Wade4 declaring that a fetus is not a
person for constitutional purposes.5 The language was not in his
original draft, and was inserted only because Justice Potter Stewart
conditioned his vote on its being added.6 Blackmun saw the
language as having created unnecessary complications and said that
if he had it to do all over again, he would have opted to lose the
seventh vote instead.7
Blackmun was a "firm believer in the author of the opinion
presenting it the way he wants to," but he regretted the plethora of
opinions the Court issued in many of its cases. "When I first came
here, I think it was true that separate concurrences were a compar-
ative rarity. Now they seem to be almost routine." Both Justices
Antonin Scalia and Ruth Bader Ginsburg liked to write their own
concurrences, and he thought that however worthwhile those might
be as a guide to the thinking of specific Justices, they contributed to
the plethora of opinions being written in many cases.
The number of opinions disturbed him because "sometimes
readers, I suppose, wonder just what the Court is saying," and the
Court had an obligation to make its thinking clear to the country.
3. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 310 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
4. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
5. See id. at 156-59.
6. Justice Blackmun did not name Justice Stewart in the interview, saying only that "a
Justice" had insisted on the language. See MARIAN FAUX, ROE V. WADE 293 (1988) ("Stewart
accepted the new draft with theproviso that the fetus was not a person under the Fourteenth
Amendment.").
7. Roe was decided by a vote of seven to two.
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"Making it clear to the country" was one reason Blackmun wanted
to write a book about the Court when he retired, although he
admitted with a puckish smile that he enjoyed mentioning the
potential project during Court conferences and watching his
colleagues "turn pale."
Lower federal courts had a similar responsibility to the public,
and Blackmun disapproved of the tendency among them not to
publish opinions explaining many of the decisions they rendered.
Blackmun frequently lamented to interviewers that "I suppose I'll
carry Roe to my grave."' By this he meant that people automatically
associated him with the abortion rights case and virtually ignored
many of his other important opinions. He was asked about Roe so
persistently by interviewers, he reported, that it came as a relief to
be questioned about other cases instead. With the exception noted
above, he was seemingly content with Roe and proud of having
prevailed when he insisted that the Court have the case reargued so
that the decision could be made by a full bench of nine Justices.
Roe was first argued and tentatively decided in December 1971,
after the deaths of Justices Hugo Black and John Marshall Harlan,
but before their successors had joined the Court. Justice Blackmun,
"realizing what Roe was all about," thought that "it deserved a
Court of nine." This was in part a matter of Court dynamics and the
insight that two additional Justices might bring. It was equally
important, he felt, "to assure the country that the decision was the
work of a full Court." The case presented the gravest constitutional
issues: 'We were balancing the individual's rights against the
compelling interest of the state." Justice William 0. Douglas argued
against postponing the announcement of a verdict, angry that the
opinion had been assigned to Blackmun by Chief Justice Burger,9
and fearful that what he saw as a very shaky five-two majority on
the Court for articulating a constitutionally protected right to
8. John A. Jenkins, A Candid Talk with Justice Blackmun, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Feb. 20,
1983, at 26.
9. Court protocol dictates that when the Chief Justice is in the minority, as Burger
initially was in Roe, the most senior Justice in the majority assigns the opinion. In this
instance, Douglas was senior, and had assumed he would write the opinion himself. Burger
nonetheless assigned it to Blackmun. See FAUX, supra note 6, at 277-79 (describing Douglas's
reaction).
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abortion might be reversed with the additional votes and possible
persuasiveness of Justices appointed by President Richard Nixon.' °
Douglas also feared that Blackmun might change his vote, in spite
of the latter's draft opinion striking down the law prohibiting
abortion. Blackmun knew his own position was firm, and "he wasn't
concerned about the initial vote." He was less apprehensive than
Douglas about new appointees, as he thought newly-appointed
Justice Lewis Powell might join the majority.
The case was heard a second time, although the second argument
was no improvement on the first. "I don't think the attorneys
contributed very much to oral argument. They did the second one
better but I don't think they helped us too much. [The lawyers for
Roe] were too antagonistic to the state's position." But "I'll never
forget those arguments, I guess," because of the importance of the
case, and because of the way the vote came out. In the end, Chief
Justice Burger voted with the majority and only then-junior Justice
William H. Rehnquist and Justice Byron White dissented, making
the vote seven-two.
The addition of Justices Powell and Rehnquist altered the Court,
as did the 1981 appointment of Sandra Day O'Connor." "The Court
changes every time there's a new face. The dynamics are different"
whenever a new Justice is appointed; "that is the way the system
works." But it was not only the dynamic that changed; so, some-
times, did votes in cases decided with the participation of the new
Justice. Blackmun had said in 1983, "I'd like to regard myself as
being a member of the center of the Court. When [Justice] Potter
Stewart was here,'2 I lined the Court up as two-five-two on the
spectrum. There were five of us in the center." Justice O'Connor,
however, provided a third vote for the "conservative" wing, and the
line-up became two-four-three. 3 Blackmun began to see his function
as attempting to retain the center, "to keep the Court in balance."'4
By the end of 1993, further appointments by Republican presidents
10. The Justices appointed by Nixon in 1971, both of whom took their seats on January
7, 1972, were Lewis F. Powell, Jr. and William H. Rehnquist.
11. Justice O'Connor, the first woman appointed to the Court, was appointed by President
Ronald Reagan and took her seat on September 25, 1981.
12. Justice Stewart retired on July 3, 1981, and was replaced by Justice O'Connor.
13. See Jenkins, supra note 8, at 23.
14. See id. at 57.
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had tilted the balance so far, Blackmun believed, that "the Court
right now [in late 1993] is a conservative Court." He named Justices
Rehnquist, Scalia, Clarence Thomas, and David H. Souter "with a
question mark" as constituting its conservative core, with Justice
O'Connor frequently providing the fifth vote. "They court her."
Although Justice O'Connor did not always vote with the "conserva-
tive" Justices, "basically she's conservative.., almost automatically
there are five consistently conservative votes."
Justice Souter 5 merited a "question mark" because "while he may
vote conservatively, he always goes along his own way. He doesn't
say 'I agree with A or B.' He may reach the same conclusion, but he
has his own reasons for it, and I have to respect that. He will grow
as the years pass." It was too early to tell where Justice Ginsburg 6
would come out because "she's not a flaming liberal, but she's not a
bend-over conservative either." Certainly, her presence would alter
the Court in ways yet to be seen.
Blackmun was not entirely happy about that. He recognized that
"the fact that she votes last is, for her, the disadvantage" of being
the most junior Justice, because "by the time she speaks just about
everything has been said." The implication was that Justice
Blackmun disapproved of Justice Ginsburg's speaking nonetheless.
"I could never do as a junior Justice some of the things she's
doing.... She writes a lot in addition to the primary opinion ....
She makes a lot of noise."
For all his apparent bewilderment over Justice Ginsburg,
Blackmun acknowledged that her impact on the Court might prove
to be positive, and compared it with that of Oliver Wendell Holmes.
"I teased my law clerks at breakfast the other day, on the eighth day
of December. I said, 'This is an anniversary, and of course you
should know what it is' and they didn't." It was on December 8, 1902
that Justice Holmes joined the Court. Blackmun speculated about
the manner in which Justice Holmes's presence must have trans-
formed the dynamics of the Court in his day, jarring "some of the
old-timers" as Justice Ginsburg seemed to jar him. (He also
wondered in passing whether Holmes's dissents were so brief
15. Justice Souter joined the Court on October 9, 1990.
16. Justice Ginsburg, the most junior Justice at the time of these conversations, took her
seat on June 14, 1993.
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because he wrote them at a standing-up desk similar to the one on
display in Blackmun's chambers.)
The presence of new Justices resulted in differing votes because
"we all come from different backgrounds, and we all have individual
biases," although "we try to suppress them, of course." The 1993
justices did not agree, for example, on the respective power of the
states and the federal government. In 1976, the Court decided
National League of Cities v. Usery,'7 striking down a law that
extended federal wage and hour regulations to almost all employees
of state and local governments on the grounds that the statute
intruded upon the states' integral governmental functions. 8
Blackmun indicated in his concurrence that if other factual
situations had been at issue he might have voted differently. 9 He
was concerned that the decision might have a negative impact on
environmental protection, traditionally within the less-than-zealous
jurisdiction of the states.2 ° His vote was seen by supporters of
federal power as one that could be reversed. When the issue was
revisited in San Antonio v. Garcia,2' he recalled feeling that much
of the oral argument was directed at him. He did change his position
and, with it, the majority.22 As he subsequently explained, "In the
17. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
18. See id. at 854.
19. See id. at 855-56 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
20. It was the first time since 1937 that the Court negated a major piece of federal
economic legislation, and Blackmun's concurrence indicated that he was not entirely happy
about the result. See id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). He was an advocate of environmental
protection, a traditional area for state rather than federal action, and recognized that the
states had been less than zealous in their concern for the environment. He nonetheless
concluded that the Usery doctrine struck the appropriate balance between federal regulatory
power and state autonomy. See id. (Blackmun, J., concerning).
21. 469 U.S. 528 (1985).
22. National League of Cities v. Usery upheld state control over "integral governmental
functions" by a vote of five to four. See 426 U.S. at 854. Garcia involved federal power to set
guidelines under the Fair Labor Standards Act for overtime wages paid by a metropolitan
transit authority. See 469 U.S. at 528. In it, Blackmun reviewed the lower court cases on the
subject, all attempting to apply Usery, but sufficiently confused to issue quite contradictory
holdings about its meaning. See id. at 537-39. "We find it difficult, if not impossible,"
Blackmun wrote, "to identify an organizing principle that places each of the cases in the first
group on one side of a line and each of the cases in the second group on the other side." Id.
at 539. Attempts by lower courts "to draw guidance from this model [Usery] have proved it
both impracticable and doctrinally barren." Id. at 557. The vote against it was 5-4, with
Blackmun's changed vote clearly the crucial one. What is shown by Usery and Garcia,
Blackmun commented, was
how the Court veers from one side to the other or, if one will, takes two steps
ahead and one back or one step ahead and two back, depending on the point of
view. If the issues were to arise again today, even with facts identical to those
of Garcia, would the result be the same with the Court as presently constituted?
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years that intervened between the two cases . .. I had become
convinced that the 'traditional governmental function' test was
unworkable." 23 This, he thought, was the way judging should be
done, with the Justices aware of how their doctrines and decisions
were working in reality rather than in theory. But in the absence of
some indication that there had been a major societal transformation
or that a Court decision had resulted in unexpected difficulties, he
counted on the Court to rely upon stare decisis. If the kind of
situation involved in Usery and Garcia had arisen in 1993, the
outcome might have been "touch and go," but he hoped and expected
that the justices would rest their decision on precedent.
Blackmun mentioned that Justice John Paul Stevens was a strong
supporter of stare decisis, emphasizing its importance to the
stability of legal rules and considering it to be almost essential in
constitutional jurisprudence. He thought that Justice O'Connor, on
the other hand, liked "to bounce around a little bit." Once again, he
considered it too soon to tell about Justice Souter.
Among the reasons it was "too soon" to be certain how the newer
Justices would affect the Court, Blackmun noted, was that many
Justices developed a constitutional philosophy only after having
joined it. Prior judicial experience did not necessarily affect this.
Blackmun felt no compulsion to develop a constitutional philosophy
during his years on the court of appeals, both because cases
involving constitutional questions "weren't as frequent as they are
here" and because "we always had the distinct comfort of knowing,
however we decided, that Washington would straighten us out." The
way the lower courts rely on the Supreme Court was "brought home
to me distinctly" in the case of Tinker v. Des Moines Community
School District,24 which raised the question of whether students
could be dismissed from school as disruptive when they wore black
arm bands to protest the war in Vietnam.25 The vote on the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit was five to three. Judge
Martin Van Oosterhout, who cast his vote with the majority,
announced, "'I'm going to change my vote and make it four to four
In other words, the Constitution was not a static entity, the Justices were fallible people
limited by their own viewpoints but trying to learn from experience and societal needs, and
the Court's doctrine inevitably would change again. He announced himself"mildly surprised,"
and presumably pleased, when Garcia was explicitly reaffirmed in South Carolina v. Baker,
485 U.S. 505 (1988). See Blackmun, supra note 1, at 756.
23. See Blackmun, supra note 1, at 756.
24. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
25. See id. at 505.
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and let those jokers in Washington straighten this out.' That's what
happened. We sense that [i.e., that the case will be taken by the
Supreme Court], and in a way, it makes us lazy." Lower court judges
were aware that "we're not the end of the line. We don't have to be
100% sure we're right in our minds because we can get reversed
anyway." That particular luxury was not available to members of
the Supreme Court.
Whatever their professional backgrounds, junior Justices reflected
both the politics of the presidents who appointed them-at least in
their early years-and the feelings of the population. "When there
are second thoughts and political attitudes change and we get
different occupants in the White House," Justices with new ideas,
new approaches, and perhaps new constitutional philosophies would
be appointed to the Court. While "I think personnel have an effect"
on doctrine, however, the unique opportunity to develop one's
constitutional philosophy made predictions about how a new Justice
would vote problematic.
It was expected, for example, that Justice Burger would "ride
roughshod" over the decisions of the Warren Court, but while many
of those decisions were altered, most of the basic doctrines re-
mained. Any tendency to undo the work of the Warren Court was
resisted not only by Justices Brennan and Marshall, but by Justice
Potter Stewart as well-and by Blackmun. "I like to think maybe I
had a little influence" on that. Justice Powell worked hard at pulling
together those who wanted to undo specific parts of the Warren
Court's legacy and those who hoped to keep it alive. "It would have
been a tragedy if the Court had just taken one Warren Court
decision after another and thrown them down the drain." That did
not mean, obviously, that decisions should never be reversed, but it
did imply, as Blackmun said pointedly at a December 1992 banquet
attended by then President-elect Bill Clinton, there should be no
political litmus test for judicial appointees. A judicial appointment
that reflected new societal thinking was fine; one made because of
a particular political commitment was not.
The great respect with which Blackmun treated other people-
itself part of the dynamic of the Court-was evident in his discussion
of his fellow Justices, as was his sense of humor about both himself
and others. He might have disagreed with their views or their style,
but his remarks were almost invariably punctuated with the
reminder that they were as entitled to their modes of thinking and
acting as he. After commenting on another Justice's differing style,
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he would add, "I can't be too critical of this; he [or she] is an equal
participant." In discussing the judicial process he was careful to add,
"I can't speak for anybody else." Respect for his colleagues appeared
to be innate and unaffected by any doctrinal differences they may
have had. He was "eternally grateful for the privilege of serving," if
only for little more than a year, with Justices John Marshall Harlan
and Hugo Black.26 Black was a "canny individual" who was "fun to
be with," and Harlan was "a thorough-going gentleman in every
respect." Blackmun noted with approval that Black and Harlan,
distant cousins, were "highly respectful of each other" despite their
differences about cases.
Blackmun reminisced about Justice Harlan's last year on the
Court, when he was "ninety-eight percent blind" and a high
intensity light was placed at his seat at the conference table. He also
spoke sadly of Justice Douglas's decline during his last years. On
the afternoon of one of our talks, Blackmun had just come from one
of his periodic visits to Justice Brennan's retirement chambers in
the Court building. Blackmun's fondness for Brennan and his
respect for Brennan's continuing intellectual prowess were as
apparent as his own concern about the failure of powers with age,
and the problem of knowing when the moment had arrived for a
justice to step down. Blackmun worked for many years as counsel
for the Mayo Clinic. While he was on the Supreme Court, he had
regular check-ups with the clinic's doctors, whom he had charged
with letting him know if they detected any sign of failing mental
powers. Age-related changes in Court personnel clearly were on
Blackmun's mind, even though he still reached the Court at 7:30 in
the morning and worked out regularly in the Court's gym before he
left for home.2"
He enjoyed the human side of his colleagues and delighted in
telling tales about them. One of his favorite anecdotes harked back
to a day early in Chief Justice Burger's tenure, when Burger proudly
took the elderly (and ideologically quite different) Hugo Black into
Burger's chambers to show him the new lights Burger had installed.
Black's only remark about the lights was a grumpy, "Too many
things changing around here."
26. Black retired on September 17, 1971, and Harlan retired on September 23, 1971.
27. Justice Blackmun announced his retirement on April 6, 1994, less than four months
after the last of these conversations. He left the bench on June 30, 1994, and died on March
4, 1999.
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Justice Douglas was skeptical about Blackmun, a Nixon ap-
pointee, because of politics and their different approaches to many
of the early cases they decided. But Douglas gradually changed his
attitude, and they eventually became "good friends at the end."
Blackmun described Douglas as "a rascal in many ways, but a very
interesting, able person. At his best, Douglas was superb." He was
"always doing something totally unconnected" during oral argument.
"I can well remember his sitting up there calling for books and
piling them up in front of him until counsel could hardly see him."
On one occasion, Blackmun was amused to glimpse Douglas writing
* away behind his books as oral argument went on. Blackmun recalls
that he "sent Douglas a note asking, 'Bill, what are you doing,
writing another opinion?'" Douglas sent back a reply saying
"Yes-mainly because this lawyer was through twenty minutes ago
and doesn't know it." But Douglas could do two things at once,
Blackmun remembered, and it was a mistake for any attorney to
assume that Douglas would not be quick to catch any error made in
argument.
It was Blackmun's wont to look at an atlas during oral argument
in order to get a feel for the geographical origins about a case being
argued. This reflected his awareness that cases involved real human
beings with real problems. Eyes twinkling, he reported that he and
Justices Rehnquist and White occasionally kept themselves awake
during less than stimulating oral arguments by thumbing through
the maps. Blackmun also recalled that Thurgood Marshall wore a
hearing aid in one ear. Blackmun too wore one. Every once in a
while, when oral argument flagged, Justice Marshall would lean
over and mouth, "Harry, I'll turn off mine if you'll turn off yours."
Blackmun did not disclose whether the offer was ever accepted.
Justice Blackmun spoke at length about oral argument, attribut-
ing his well-known reluctance to interrupt attorneys during them to
something Justice Black did soon after Blackmun joined the Court.
Walking into the junior Justice's chambers and carrying an opinion
that Blackmun had circulated, Black enthused, "Harry, I like it. It
goes for the jugular. Always go for the jugular, but don't agonize in
public." Then, Blackmun continued, "he went on and said, 'As the
senior on the Court, let me say to you as the junior, don't ask many
questions [during oral argument]. . . . If you don't ask many
questions, then you will not ask many foolish questions.' I thought
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that was pretty good advice." He made an effort to adhere to it,
feeling Black watching over his shoulder. Shortly after Justice
Ginsburg participated in her first oral argument on the Court, he
recalled, he repeated Justice Black's advice to her, and he expressed
himself as somewhat bewildered that it seemed not to affect the
frequency of her questions thereafter.
Finding oral argument useful, Blackmun was disturbed by "the
suggestion or two" heard from some members of the Court that it
might be eliminated in relatively simple cases where the facts were
not in dispute. "Some are almost ready to say it serves no function."
The idea that oral argument was pass6, he noted, was fashionable
among federal courts. Some lower courts heard arguments only in
particular cases. He, however, had thought oral argument particu-
larly important when he served on the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit where, as in all circuit courts, only three judges
normally heard a case, the setting was more informal and intimate,
and there could be a great deal of give-and-take. "A good oralist can
add a lot to a case and help [us] in our later analysis of what the
case is all about," Blackmun commented. "Many times confusion [in
the brief] is clarified by what the lawyers have to say. Many times
in oral argument concessions are made which are helpful."
Attorneys responding to questions might move away from overly
strong positions in order to gain the greatest number of votes. So,
Blackmun said, while he chose not to participate frequently in oral
argument, "I usually go into an oral argument having gone over the
briefs and having a list of questions that I would hope would be
asked either by someone else or by me." He would make a point of
asking them, but only if no other Justice did so first.
He continued to warn that questioning could be overdone. Oral
argument sometimes "sharpens the focus of the case if we let the
lawyers do that and don't interrupt them with constant questions.
... It's hard to get everything out in thirty minutes, especially if
Justices interrupt." He could never, as a junior Justice, have been
as active during oral argument as he considered Justices Scalia and
Ginsburg to be. He smiled ruefully at what he saw as something of
a "competition" between them to see who could ask more questions,
but quickly added that a lot of questions could be a sign that a
Justice was in thorough control of the facts and issues in the cases.
"Justice Thomas," he noted without further comment, "of course
hasn't opened his mouth this term."
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Blackmun welcomed the moments when questioning by the
justices sharpened a line of argument that appeared "fuzzy" in the
briefs or clarified a fact situation, because he particularly regretted
the occasional necessity for the Court's opinion to say something
along the lines of "it is not entirely clear from the record but we
assume...."He was relieved when uncertainty about the facts was
cleared up in oral argument. Besides, he declared with a grin,
"clients like oral argument. They like to see their lawyers get up
[and represent them in the Supreme Court, although] sometimes I
can sense how disappointed they are." He agreed with the lawyer's
conventional wisdom that cases can be lost but not won on oral
argument, so good attorneys would do well to prepare themselves as
thoroughly as possible.
While Blackmun was not particularly impressed by either the
male or female lawyers inRoe v. Wade2" and did not feel they helped
the Court fashion doctrine in the case, he was pleased that it had
become more common since then to see women arguing cases before
the Supreme Court. He described them as particularly competent:
"They don't ask for or give any quarter." On the rare occasion when
they faltered, Justice O'Connor might "move in." Blackmun had not
asked her about it, but he had the feeling that this was because of
an understandable eagerness to see the women lawyers appearing
before the Court doing well.
In spite of his praise for oral argument, he predicted rather sadly
that "the Court will reach the point" of giving it up, but only after he
had left the bench.
The third factor Blackmun emphasized about the process of
constitutional adjudication, in addition to the constancy of the
Constitution and the dynamic among the Justices, was the Court's
relationship with the citizenry. He favored oral argument in part
because he believed it brought the Court closer to those involved.
For the same reason, he enjoyed speaking at law schools or other
gatherings away from the Court.
I like to find out what people are thinking about the Court and its
decisions. After all, this is a country made up of individuals, of people.
28. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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... There are little people involved in so many of these cases-real
people with real feelings of despair and other things that go with it.
It was of crucial importance, Blackmun believed, that the "little
people" knew that the American judicial system could be responsive
to them. Some of his colleagues "haven't gotten out of the classroom
and are wrestling with theory" instead of thinking of the impact
their decisions are likely to have on human beings. "I can't be
critical of that," he immediately injected, even though that approach
was not his, "that's the way the law builds." He was too aware that
"the buck stops here" to be contemptuous of those whose sense of
responsibility led them to conclusions different from his own. That
awareness affected his thinking and the almost oppressive sense of
responsibility he brought to decisionmaking, as well as the lengthy
hours he spent poring over the cases before the Court, both when he
was at the Court and when he was home or away on what suppos-
edly were vacations. He mentioned, as he had elsewhere, that he
thought he worked hard when he was counsel at the Mayo Clinic; he
worked even harder while he was on the court of appeals; but he had
never worked as hard as he did on the Supreme Court, and as a
result the demands on his time were close to overwhelming. He had
acknowledged that in spite of Justice Black's advice, "I probably
agonize over cases more than I should, and more than most of my
colleagues do."29 He elaborated on his reason: "There's no other
place" for people who feel abused by the political system to go once
the Court has decided, no higher court to which they can appeal,
and that meant "we'd better be right."
Smiling as he quoted the comment made by Finley Peter Dunne's
fictional character, Mr. Dooley, that "the Court follows the election
returns,"" he added that while that is a substantial overstatement,
public feeling as reflected in elections "is a factor" in the Court's
assessment of societal needs. "This doesn't mean we just follow
public opinion, [of course] we can't do that," because then the Court
would ignore its mandate as the guardian of the Constitution and
never strike down any legislation. But the Court has a responsibility
to be aware of the electorate's concerns. Blackmun mentioned Alexis
de Tocqueville's comment that "scarcely any political question arises
in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or later, into a
29. Jenkins, supra note 8, at 26.
30. FINLEY PETER DuNNE, MR. DOOLEY'S OPINIONS 26 (New York, R.H.Russell 1901).
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judicial question.""' The Court had to remember that it was making
policy for the people.
Justices also had to be sensitive, a theme that was reflected in
Blackmun's remarks about the desirability of permitting lawyers to
proceed with minimal interruption during oral arguments and his
concern about the distance many people felt lay between themselves
and the judicial system. "There's nothing that gives me greater
satisfaction than to have a lawyer tell me, after argument and after
the opinions come down," that even though the lawyer lost, "'we feel
we had a fair shake.'" That and "getting it right," to Justice
Blackmun, was what judging was about.
The obligation to do the right thing was personal as well as
collective, and a constant in his thinking. The Court might have
been wrong and any one Justice might not have been able to prevent
that, but he had a responsibility to work at a case until he was
certain that he, at least, was as correct as was humanly possible. "I
have to be sure in my position. The fact that there's disagreement
on the Court doesn't cut any ice one way or the other. I don't want
my vote to be something that five years from now I'll regret not
having put enough effort into." And there would be regret if the
wrong thing was done to the "little people." When Blackmun
referred to "little people," he was thinking not of"them" but of"us."
He attributed his concern for "little people" to his own life, which
began in "very modest circumstances"-but added immediately that
of course he didn't have the additional burden placed by this country
on people of color. "[Although] my family didn't have much," Justice
Burger's family had even less. Blackmun and the former Chief
Justice had been friends since they were five years old,3" and
Blackmun remembered Burger's mother as having been close to a
"saint" for managing to raise nine children "literally on nothing."
Justice Burger's fine upbringing did not result in his always
having done the "right thing," however. Blackmun told others that
"I've always been more liberal than the Chief Justice [Burger] ....
Always." 3 Disagreement among the Justices was not sufficiently
rare to be remarkable. What was unusual, however, was the way
Blackmun mentally distinguished his colleagues from their judicial
31. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AIERICA 290 (Phillips Bradley ed., 1945).
32. The two men became close friends at home in Minnesota, and while the friendship
lapsed after high school, Blackmun was the best man at Burger's wedding in 1933.
33. Jenkins, supra note 8, at 26.
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stances. Although he was not alone in this, he maintained his
warmth for colleagues with whom he differed strongly about issues,
and spoke emphatically against their positions without losing his
delight in them as individuals.
Blackmun might have had any number of colleagues in mind
when he told the 1990 graduating class of Washington and Lee Law
School, "There are arrogant people in this world and arrogant
lawyers and, what is worse, arrogant judges."3 4 Respectful of his
colleagues though he was, Blackmun was too committed to his
vision of justice not to become angry when he saw it being violated,
and Justice Burger had been one of his targets. This was the
situation in Bowers v. Hardwick,35 when the Court upheld a Georgia
statute criminalizing sodomy between consenting adults in private
as well as in public.36 Initially, Blackmun remembered, the vote
went the other way, and he mentioned Justice Powell's subsequent
public statements that Powell regretted his final vote in Bowers-as,
Blackmun implied, he should have. Blackmun got the sense from
Justice Byron White's opinion for the Court that the majority was
"reaching for a result and didn't get it by constitutional analysis."
Justice Burger's concurrence showed that "he didn't know his
history."37
That was a relatively mild Blackmun comment. Dissenting in
other cases, he had spoken of a Rehnquist opinion as "wholly
irrational" and "his exegesis of the Court's reasons... simplistic to
the point of caricature."" He had written that one of Justice
O'Connor's opinions was "unnecessary and unfair," "mischaracteri-
zes the holding of the Court of Appeals, undertakes an intricate
economic analysis of hypothetical situations not presented here,"
"simply and completely misstates the issue," "authorizes employers
to make 'cheap offers' to the victims of their past discrimination,"
and shows "studied indifference to the real-life concerns of the
parties."39 He read White's opinion in Bowers as "relegat[ing] the
actual statute being challenged to a footnote" and "distort[ing] the
34. Tony Mauro, 20 Years With the 'Shy Person's Justice', LEGAL TIMES, June 25, 1990,
at 10.
35. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
36. See id. at 189.
37. See id. at 196-97 (Burger, C.J., concurring) (asserting that sodomy has been
universally criminalized throughout Western history).
38. See Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 20, 23 (1982) (Blackmun, J., concurring).
39. See Ford Motor Co. v. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 458 U.S. 219, 242,
249, 255 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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question this case presents."4" He told one interviewer, "[i]f one feels
strongly about a major issue with social and economic overtones, I
think it deserves some strong talk once in a while. Everybody gets
surprised when I produce it. They think it's out of character."41 It
was not. Quite simply, Blackmun cared passionately about the
people whose rights he believed the Court had an obligation to
protect.
He spoke feelingly of the strides the country still had to make in
racial equality, and he expressed great sympathy for the millions of
people of many races who did not enjoy the jobs at which they had
to labor. He was able to empathize with people who were not at all
like himself. While, as he commented, some of his younger col-
leagues were so shocked at the idea of homosexuality that they
wrote their opinions in Bowers as if they were unaware that the
statute banned heterosexual as well as homosexual sodomy, there
was real regret in his voice as he speculated that the vote probably
would not have been different if it were taken in the Court of 1993.
He was nonetheless certain that the decision eventually would be
reversed; "it just has to [be]."
In his dissent in Bowers,42 Blackmun referred to the Court's
holding in Minersville School District v. Gobitis4" that forcing school
children to salute the flag was constitutional4 and its overturning
of that decision a mere three years later.4"
I can only hope that here, too, the Court soon will reconsider its
analysis and conclude that depriving individuals of the right to choose
for themselves how to conduct their intimate relationships poses a far
greater threat to the values most deeply rooted in our Nation's history
than tolerance of nonconformity could ever do.... [Tihe Court today
betrays those values ..... 46
One got the sense that Blackmun balanced his view that a fight
constantly had to be made for justice with the belief that, given the
fight, justice ultimately will prevail. He had said, invoking Justice
Benjamin Cardozo, that
40. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199-200 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
41. Jenkins, supra note 8, at 57.
42. See Bowers, 478 U.S. 213-14 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
43. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).
44. See id. at 600.
45. See West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
46. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 214 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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.we worry unduly about the consequences of our errors. He indicated
that what was proper to decision making would endure and what was
bad would be rejected when passed on in the laboratory of the years.
We must do the best we can with the close and emotional issues; they
and others like them always will be present."47
And sooner or later, he was certain, the Court would get it right.
John Marshall wrote, "we must never forget, that it is a constitu-
tion we are expounding," " meaning that the document was designed
to be sufficiently flexible to change along with the country that
adopted it. Justice Blackman's judicial opinions in effect added an
enjoinder that "we must remember that it is the people for whom we
are interpreting the Constitution." The meaning and application of
the Constitution's phrases necessarily undergo alteration as the
country does; change is inevitable. The Constitution itself, however,
provides continuity. So does the effort of the Justices to discharge
their never ending responsibility to the people and, in doing so, to
recognize and perhaps affect what Blackmun called his "theme of
constant development of the concepts of justice."49 To Justice
Blackmun, that clearly was what the Supreme Court was all about:
the Constitution, the people, and justice, and the attempt of each
Justice to maintain a seamless web among them.
47. Corrizosa, supra note 1, at 22 (quoting Justice Harry A. Blackmun).
48. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)
49. Blackmun, supra note 1, at 750.
